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NOTES
appearance of the party at the hearing? In the past courts have
limited the cure of a defective notice to an actual appearance
and participation in the hearing.
In this case the court has extended the doctrine of waiver of
notice by an actual appearance and participation in the proceed-
ing to an appearance with counsel in the corridor, adjoining the
hearing room. Because of the peculiar facts in the case, it is be-
lieved that such an extension is justified. First, the parties did
appear, in a sense of the word; and although they did not par-
ticipate in the hearing, they were given full opportunity to do so.
It was their own choice in refusing the request to participate in
the hearing. Second, the alleged non-compliance with the act8
did not prejudice the parties. This was evidenced by the parties
having been present at the proper place, at the correct time, and
with counsel. Their appearance at the hearing with counsel was
precisely the object to be accomplished by the notice.
WILLIAIVI E. ROGERS
ALIMONY-EVIDENCE OF FAULT-AcCRUED PAYMENTS UNDER
SUSPENSIVE APPEAL-In June of 1940, plaintiff husband was
awarded an absolute divorce on the ground of two years volun-
tary separation. The wife reconvened for alimony, and the court,
concluding that the evidence did not warrant a finding that she
had been at fault,' awarded alimony at the rate of five dollars
a week. Plaintiff's evidence, which might have proved that the
parties had never lived together, was ruled inadmissible on the
ground that it was irrelevant in determining the fault issue. From
the alimony judgment, he appealed suspensively. Since neither
litigant sought to have the case removed to the preference docket
until 1947, eight and one-half years passed before the supreme
court heard the case Held, on appeal, the evidence admitted be-
low was inconclusive on the issue of fault and evidence that the
parties had never lived together would have been relevant in
determining this issue. The case was remanded for admission of
the excluded evidence and determination of the fault issue, with
instructions to reinstate the prior judgment if defendant was not
found to have been at fault. Reich v. Grieif, 38 So. (2d) 381 (La.
1949).
8. La. Act 185 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 2248].
1. The defendant wife against whom is pronounced a judgment of divorce
on the grounds of two year separation may be awarded alimony if she was
not at fault in causing the separation. Art. 160, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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In Louisiana, the criteria for determining the question of
fault have never been well settled.2 Alimony has been awarded
where evidence showed that the separation had occurred by mu-
tual consent.3 The principle accepted here is that "at fault" de-
notes main fault. But the negative approach has been taken in
some decisions4 requiring that the wife "not be at fault," mean-
ing apparently that she must be "predominantly" free from
fault.5 The case under consideration perhaps supports this posi-
tion as it was remanded because the evidence did not establish
the fact that the wife was free from fault. Although an examina-
tion of the cases fails to reveal a definitely settled approach,"
the "main fault" criterion seems the more desirable, as there is
little real justification for relieving a husband of the obligation
to pay alimony if his responsibility for the separation is as great
as or greater than thatof his wife. 7
In any event, the supreme court consistently has inquired
into many circumstances of the marital relationship in order to
determine the fault issue. In this respect, the instant case is di-
rectly in line with prior cases."
In deciding that over $2200 in alimony, which had accrued
for eight years under suspensive appeal, could be recovered in
a lump sum (if the district court again failed to find the wife at
fault), the court resolved any doubt that may have been created
in this direction by the earlier case of Scott v. ScottY In the
Scott case alimony amounting to $1500 had accrued for only three
years; but the court felt that testimony taken three years pre-
2. For a discussion of the disadvantages of allowing alimony to turn on
the question of fault, see Daggett, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the year 1941-1942 Term-Family Law (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 193, 196, commenting on August v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 9 So. (2d)
402 (1942).
3. Bienvenue v. Bienvenue, 192 La. 395, 188 So. 41 (1939).
4. Pitre v. Burlett, 190 La. 127, 182 So. 123 (1938).
5. "Experience and common sense should tell us that when matrimonial
dicflculties arise, the fault is almost never all on one side." 2 Vernier, Ameri-
can Family Laws (1932) § 104. Art. 3556, § 13, La. Civil Code of 1870, illus-
trates three degrees of fault and one for which no responsibility attaches.
No court has held that any fault at all on the part of the wife would defeat
alimony.
6. Martin v. Martin, 191 La. 761, 186 So. 94 (1939); Alexander v. Jackson,
195 La. 808, 197 So. 510 (1940); Davis v. Watts, 208 La. 290, 23 So.(2d) 97
(1945).
7. See Keezer, The Law of Marriage and Divorce (Morland's 3rd ed.
1946) §§ 631-632; Vernier, loc. cit. supra note 5.
8. Pitre v. Burlett, 190 La. 127, 182 So. 123 (1938); Bienvenue v. Bienvenue,
192 La. 395, 188 So. 41 (1939); Martin v. Martin, 191 La. 761, 186 So. 94 (1939);
Alexander v. Jackson, 195 La. 808, 197 So. 510 (1940).
9. 197 La. 726, 2 So.(2d) 193 (1941).
NOTES
viously would not accurately show the wife's present need or
the husband's present ability to pay. The case was remanded for
a determination of the present financial conditions of the parties,
and the wife was deprived of the alimony that had accrued under
suspensive appeal.10 The manner in which the Scott case was
handled is difficult to reconcile with the general scheme of our
system of appeals and with the laws on increase and reduction
of alimony." Although the evidence in the lower court was not
conflicting or inadequate, it was ignored, and the lower court was
required to consider what in effect was a new controversy. The
supreme court evidently failed to take into consideration the
fact that the appeal questioned only the validity of the judgment
below.' 2 A somewhat similar approach had been taken in the
earlier case of Abrams v. Rosenthal,3 an alimony suit in which
the husband attempted to introduce new evidence in the supreme
court to show the income of the wife during a period subsequent
to the original trial. Apparently the income of the wife had
changed pending appeal. Relying on its so-called "equity" pow-
ers, the supreme court remanded the case for consideration of
the new evidence. Whether the supreme court is vested with
authority to remand a case on the basis of new evidence not ma-
terial to any issue involved in the original trial is open to serious
doubt.' 4 Article 906 of the Code of Practice confers broad powers
upon the supreme court to remand cases, and on the basis of this
article the supreme court has been considered to have authority
to remand a case with instructions to hear evidence arising after
trial in the lower court, but indicative of conditions as of the
time of the trial below.15
In the present case, the court did not mention the Scott or
10. Chief Justice O'Niell, speaking for a unanimous court, said, "The
lawmakers never intended that alimony should be paid in a large lump sum,
or otherwise than in installments of such amounts and of such frequency
as she needs the money." 197 La. 726, 730-731, 2 So.(2d) 193, 194 (1941).
11. Art. 232, La. Civil Code of 1870, allows parties at any time to institute
summary proceedings to obtain the benefit of any change in status.
12.. In neither appellant's or appellee's brief was the contention made
that the financial condition of the parties had changed pending appeal.
13. 151 La. 987, 92 So. 567 (1922).
14. Cf. Slagle v. Slagle, 205 La. 694, 698, 17 So.(2d) 923, 924 (1944), where
the cases was remanded because of error below with instructions to the
effect, "in the interest of justice, it is being remanded without restriction on
the part of either party to introduce any evidence that may be available
touching on Slagle's ability to meet these alimony payments from June 1
until his resumption of work, as well as thereafter."
15. Robison v. Howell, 22 La. Ann. 524 (1870); Union National Bank v.
Evans, 43 La. Ann. 372 (1891); Vilce v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 So.(2d) 243 (La.
App. 1944); McClung v. Delta Shipbuilding Co., 33 So.(2d) 438 (La. App.
1948).
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Abrams cases. There is no inference that the decision purports
to limit the discretion exercised in those cases. Hence, although
the Reich case does not necessarily manifest a change in the in-
terpretation of the law, at least it represents a changed attitude
in its application to certain factual situations. The approach now
taken seems to be more logical and correct, as a strict adherence
to the Scott and Abrams cases would lead to the paradox of a
wife being deprived of alimony for a period during which she
was entitled to it as a matter of law.
E. DREW McKINNIS
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY-ENCROACHMENTS ON RIVER BANKS BY
RIPARIAN OWNERs-Defendant owned a warehouse that extended
from the adjacent land across the bank' to the water line of a
navigable river, within the corporate limits of Madisonville.
Plaintiff city brought suit to compel the defendant to destroy
or remove the warehouse on the ground that it obstructed and
embarrassed the use of the bank, which is common to all. Held,
under Article 862 of the Civil Code,2 the building should be per-
mitted to remain, for it merely encroaches upon the bank and
does not absolutely prevent its use. Town of Madisonville v. Den-
dinger, 38 So.(2d) 252 (La. 1948).
It is elementary that "the use of the banks of navigable
streams or rivers is public," and Louisiana courts have almost
1. Art. 457, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The banks of a river or stream are
understood to be that which contains it in its ordinary state of high water;
for the nature of the banks does not change, although for some causes they
may be overflowed for a time.
"Nevertheless on the borders of the Mississippi and other navigable
streams, where there are levees, established according to law, the levees shall
form the banks."
"The bank of a river is that space which the water covers when the
river is highest In any season of the year." Sweeney v. Shakespeare, 42 La.
Ann. 614, 7 So. 729, 21 Am. St. 400 (1890).
2. Art. 862, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the works, formerly constructed
on the public soil, consist of houses or other buildings, which can not be
destroyed, without causing signal damage to the owner of them, and if these
houses or other buildings merely encroach upon the public way, without pre-
venting its use, they shall be permitted to remain, but the owner shall be
bound, when he rebuilds them, to relinquish that part of the soil or of the
public way, upon which they formerly stood."
3. Art. 455 La. Civil Code of 1870: "The use of the banks of navigable
rivers or streams is public; accordingly every one has a right freely to bring
his vessels to land there, to make fast the same to the trees which are there
planted, to unload his vessels, to deposit his goods, to dry his nets, and the
like.
"Nevertheless the ownership of the river banks belongs to those who
possess the adjacent lands."
